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Trial court is required to appoint a guardian ad litem to determine child’s best interests. “For example, if paternity is contested, the child’ s legitimacy is at issue, and the legal father has not had notice or an opportunity to be heard, the trial court is required to appoint a guardian ad litem and hear from the guardian and all the parties before proceeding. See Privette, 617 So. 2d at 308; Daniel, 695 So. 2d at 1255. At a minimum, the court must evaluate the best interests of the child. See Hebner v. Barry, 834 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (reversing trial court’s order that putative father undergo blood testing where trial court failed to make findings of fact in regard to whether the paternity test was in best interests of the child); Lander, 906 So. 2d at 1135 (remanding for a hearing in a case where the putative father brought the paternity action, and directing that the best interests of the child be considered).” Dep’t of Revenue o/b/o Garcia v. Iglesias

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A putative father seeking to avoid a paternity test can raise the Privette presumption. A putative father seeking to avoid a blood test may raise the presumption in the context of his privacy interest. See Privette, 617 So. 2d at 309 n.8 (Fla. 1993) (‘By asserting a privacy interest the putative father necessarily puts in issue the child’s best interests, which substantially implicates the presumption. If the child’s best interests require maintaining the presumption, then the presumption will prevail because the State will lack a compelling interest justifying the blood test.’). Dep’t of Revenue o/b/o Garcia v. Iglesias

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Department of Revenue in Florida

Department of Revenue (DOR) can file paternity action against both legal and biological fathers. “DOR’s position is that it may file a paternity action against both the legal father and biological father, and that the issues of the best interests of the child and the presumption of legitimacy should be dealt with during the proceedings. We agree.”

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| Jan 5, 2012 | Alimony

It is the exceptional case where a couple’s resources are sufficient to maintain two separate households with the same standard of living. “The standard-of-living is not a super-factor” over the other considerations. Donoff v. Donoff, 940 So. 2d 1221, 1225 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006); see Pirino v. Pirino, 549 So. 2d 219, 220 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989) (‘Indeed, it is the exceptional case when a couple’s resources and earnings prove sufficient to maintain two independent households in the same manner as the original household.).” Beasley v. Beasley. 

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Alimony – Standard of Review of Trial Court’s Rulings in Florida

Trial Court’s Decision on whether to award permanent alimony is subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review. “‘A trial court’s decision on whether to award permanent periodic alimony is subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review.’ Hornyak v. Hornyak, 48 So. 3d 858, 861 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010); see Mondello v. Torres, 47 So. 3d 389, 396 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (noting that “the nature and amount of an award of alimony is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial court” (citation, internal quotation marks, and alteration omitted)); § 61.08(2), Fla. Stat. (2009). Beasley v. Beasley

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Paying Interest on Child Support In Florida – Circuit Court Ruling

A payor is required to pay interest on arrearages in child support.

“We also hold that it was error for the circuit court not to require the father to pay interest on the arrearage. See id. (‘The former wife is also entitled to collect prejudgment interest for all arrearages from the initial date that the former husband owed unpaid child support.’). Hernandez v. Hernandez

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A final judgment awarding alimony and child support creates a presumption that the payor has the ability to pay. The payor bears the burden of proof to demonstrate that the payor cannot pay. “The final judgment of support created a presumption that the father had the ability to pay child support and to purge himself of any subsequent contempt. See § 61.14(5)(a), Fla. Stat. (2010) (“If the obligor subsequently fails to pay alimony or support and a contempt hearing is held, the original order of the court creates a presumption that the obligor has the present ability to pay the alimony or support and to purge himself or herself from the contempt.”). The father did not appear at the contempt hearing and, therefore, did not show that he lacked the ability to purge himself of the contempt within a reasonable time. See id. (“At the contempt hearing, the obligor shall have the burden of proof to show that he or she lacks the ability to purge himself or herself from the contempt.”). Hernandez v. Hernandez 

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Failure to exercise time-sharing results in an adjustment of child support. “We previously held that application of section 61.30(11(b) is mandatory. Seiberlich v. Wolf, 859 So. 2d 570, 571 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003). Florida law mandates a reduction in child support whenever the non-custodial parent spends a “substantial amount of time” with the child. § 61.3O(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2006). It seems intuitive that, conversely, the failure to spend time with a child mandates forfeiture of the right to a reduction in child support. The Legislature has specifically provided that a parent’s failure to exercise court-ordered or agreed-upon time-sharing, not caused by the other parent, resulting in the adjustment of child support “shall be deemed a substantial change of circumstances….” § 61.30(11)(c), Fla. Stat. (2001). That modification is “retroactive to the date the noncustodial parent first failed to regularly exercise court-ordered or agreed visitation. Id.” Buhler v. Buhler

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A homestead may be sold and the funds will be protected as long as they are held for the sole purpose of acquiring a new home. “A protected homestead may be voluntarily sold, and the funds will be protected so long as they are not commingled and are held for the sole purpose of acquiring another home within a reasonable period of time. McKean v. Warburton, 919 So. 2d 341, 344 (Fla. 2005); Rossano v. Britesmile, Inc., 919 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005).” Roth v. Roth

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In order for a putative father to be precluded from challenging a paternity determination based upon the conduct specified in Fla. Stat. § 742.18(3), he must know that he is not the child’s father and engage in the conduct specified in Fla. Stat. § 742.18(3). “Although there was evidence to support the finding that the Former Husband should have suspected that he was not the child’s biological father, there was no evidence to support a finding that he did in fact know that he was not the child’s father at the time he signed the child’s birth certificate…The language of subsection (3), however, clearly refers to the male engaging in these acts ‘after learning that he is not the biological father of the child.’ § 742.18(3)…We recognize that our conclusion here conflicts with the First District’s opinion in Hooks v. Quaintance, 36 Fla. L. Weekly D2214 (Fla. 1st DCA Oct. 6, 2011).” P.G. v. E.W.